The Elements of Decision Alignment

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UCI 2017

The Elements of Decision Alignment

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UCI 2017

When one object makes a request of another object, why do we expect the second object's behavior to satisfy the first object's wishes?

Networks of entities making requests of other entities:

- Object-oriented programs
- Human organizations
- Human economies

Borrowing Ideas from Economics

"Like an economist ... we are interested in individual agents not so much for what they are internally as for what they have to offer each other

... much of object-oriented design is indeed Design by Contract."

Object-Oriented Software Construction
Bertrand Meyer, 1997

Overview


Making Requests

Aligning Decisions

Making Tradeoffs

Dividing and Composing Knowledge

Making Requests




Principal-Agent relationships



Principal-Agent relationships




Principal-Agent relationships



Object to Object (software eng)

Principal-Agent networks



Object to Object (software eng)

From Econ:

A **Principal** sends a request to an **Agent**.

An **Agent** reacts to a request from a **Principal**.

From Econ:

A Principal sends a request to an Agent. An Agent reacts to a request from a Principal.

Incentive Alignment is when a (*human*) Principal or Agent uses incentives to induce the other's intentions to align with their own.

From Econ:

A Principal sends a request to an Agent. An Agent reacts to a request from a Principal.

Incentive Alignment is when a (*human*) Principal or Agent uses incentives to induce the other's intentions to **align** with their own.

align: Compose well without interference.

From Econ:

A Principal sends a request to an Agent. An Agent reacts to a request from a Principal.

Incentive Alignment is when a (<u>human</u>) Principal or Agent uses <u>incentives</u> to induce the other's <u>intentions</u> to align with their own.

align: Compose well without interference.

From us:

Decision Alignment is when a Principal or Agent uses *various tools* to make it more likely for the other's *decisions and actions* to align with their own.

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Decision Alignment is when a Principal or Agent uses *various tools* to make it more likely for the other's *decisions and actions* to align with their own.

From us:

Decision Alignment is when a <u>Principal</u> or <u>Agent</u> uses various tools to make it more likely for <u>the other's</u> decisions and actions to align with their own.


This talk:

Decision Alignment is when a *Principal* uses various tools to make it more likely for *the Agent's* decisions and actions to align with its own.

Information Hiding Benefits

Compose specialized knowledge

Only Principal knows **why**Only Agent knows **how**Shared knowledge burden: only what's needed for request Minimize cascading changes




Hidden Information Hazards

The principal-agent problem

Pre: Can the agent do what I want?

Request: Will the agent try to do what I want?

Post: Is the agent doing what I want?



Pre

Hidden characteristics

Adverse Selection

Request/Contract

Execute the request

Incentive Alignment

Post

Hidden actions

Moral Hazard

Econ: intentional misbehavior

Pre

Hidden characteristics

Request/Contract

Execute the request

Post

Hidden actions

Econ: intentional misbehavior

CS: accidental misbehavior

Pre

Hidden characteristics

Select agent.
Screening.
Agent signals.

Inspect internals. Abilities, limits.

Request/Contract

Execute the request

Allow actions. Scope of authority.

Explain request.

What the agent is supposed to do.

Reward cooperation. If agent does that.


Post

Hidden actions


Monitor effects.
What agent is doing, or did.


Feedback to guide future selection.

Only loosely ordered



Only loosely ordered






From Incentive Alignment ...

	Human to Human	Human to Object	Object to Object	Object to Human
Select agent				
Inspect internals				
Allow actions				
Explain request				
Reward cooperation	Incentive Alignment			
Monitor effects				


... to Principal-Agent ...

Recognize synergies




... to Decision Alignment

Recognize commonalities




... to Decision Alignment

Recognize commonalities







Fit, Reputation




Hand over the package




Delivery address, instructions






Hope and pray?




Track, Return receipt




Package Delivery


Reputation feedback, Rating




Static vs. Dynamic




De-emphasize Rewards




De-emphasize Rewards




Hire the best. Find libraries.




Code reviews. Some static checking.




All user's authority.




All user's authority.




Rights per request




Rights per request



API Design



Testing. Bug reports.



The Elements of Decision Alignment

	Human to Human	Human to/from Object	Object to Object
Select agent	Trademark Chain of custody	App stores White and black lists	Trusted developer Same origin
Inspect internals	Accounting controls	Trusted path URL bar	Types, Verification Open source eyeballs
Allow actions	Law, Contracts	App permissions Powerbox	Security Protection patterns
Explain request	Language	User interface	Abstraction
Reward cooperation	Economics Incentive Alignment	Objective functions	Machine learning Agorics
Monitor effects	Reviews, Complaints Word of mouth	Bug reports	Contracts, Testing Backprop



Tuning Tradeoffs

Select agent


Inspect internals

Allow actions


Explain request

Reward cooperation


Monitor effects




Tuning Tradeoffs




Package Delivery Business







Organizational Employment




Safe Plugin Boundary




Bitcoin, Etherium



Etherium Hard Fork



Etherium once repaired



Ka-Ping Yee, 2007 dissertation

Programmer may wish to bias the election.

Programmer and code as untrusted agent.

Ka-Ping Yee, 2007 dissertation

Programmer may wish to bias the election.

Must write simple code that seems obviously correct.

400 lines of simple code in simple language.

Extensive rationale justifying each line.

Ka-Ping Yee, 2007 dissertation

Programmer may wish to bias the election.

Must write simple code that seems obviously correct.

Subject to extremely intense review.

Intense review of simple code is effective at spotting *accidental* bugs and vulnerabilities.

Ka-Ping Yee, 2007 dissertation

Programmer may wish to bias the election.

Must write simple code that seems obviously correct.

Subject to extremely intense review.

I am one of the reviewers who failed to find malicious bugs. None succeeded at finding all three bugs.

Ka-Ping Yee, 2007 dissertation

Programmer may wish to bias the election.

Must write simple code that seems obviously correct.

Subject to extremely intense review.

Malicious bugs easily evade detection by review or testing.

Ka-Ping Yee, 2007 dissertation


Programmer may wish to bias the election.

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
Malicious bugs easily evade detection by review <u>or</u> testing.

Harder to evade detection by review and testing.




Inspect

Monitor




for
$$(i = 0; i \le limit; i++)$$

Looks fine.



Inspect


Monitor



for
$$(i = 0; i \le limit; i++)$$


Looks fine.

Fails on zero and one.



Inspect

Monitor




for (i = 0; i <= limit; i++) for (i = 0; i < limit; i++) if (j ===
$$72374928$$
)

Looks fine.

Fails on zero and one.

Passes all tests.



Inspect

Monitor

for (i = 0; i <= limit; i++) for (i = 0; i < limit; i++) if (j ===
$$72374928$$
)


Looks fine.

Fails on zero and one.


Looks weird.

Passes all tests.


Compose Compromises




Inspect




Monitor




Cross Bracing






Package Delivery



Allow

Broad Least Authority


Broad Authority




Allow

Broad L

Broad Authority






Allow


Broad Employer


Broad Authority Deliver a) principal benefit b) agent benefit



Allow

Broad Least Authority





Allow


Deliver


a) principal benefit


b) agent benefit


Least Authority

Damage, c) principal harm Steal Lose e) agent d) agent benefit neutral












Allow + Reward





Allow Reward








Allow + Reward + a little Select


























Allow + Reward





Allow Reward






Allow + Reward + a little Select







Isolating effects in Space

Memory-unsafe, imperative

Isolating effects in Space

Memory-unsafe, imperative

Purely Functional

Isolating effects in Space

Memory-unsafe, imperative Memory-safe, imperative

Purely Functional

Isolating effects in Space

Memory-unsafe, imperative Memory-safe, imperative

OCap

Purely Functional

Isolating effects in Space

Memory-unsafe, imperative Memory-safe, imperative OCap

Purely Functional

Isolating effects in Time

Isolating effects in Space

Memory-unsafe, imperative

Memory-safe, imperative

OCap

Purely Functional

Isolating effects in Time

Pre-emptive multithreading

Isolating effects in Space

Memory-unsafe, imperative Memory-safe, imperative OCap Purely Functional

Isolating effects in Time

Pre-emptive multithreading Cooperative multithreading

Isolating effects in Space

Memory-unsafe, imperative

Memory-safe, imperative

OCap


Purely Functional

Isolating effects in Time

Pre-emptive multithreading


Cooperative multithreading

Communicating Event Loops




Internal Software Development


API Design




Explain request Shared Understandings









Explain request Shared Understandings







Explain request Abstraction boundaries







Principal *why*Multiple purposes


Interface what

Agent *how* Multiple means






Structural Similarities



Shifting mixtures of humans and software.



Shifting mixtures of humans and software.

Division of knowledge hazards

Econ: intentional misbehavior

CS: accidental misbehavior

Pre

Hidden characteristics

Request

Execute the request

Post

Hidden actions


Shifting mixtures of humans and software.

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Compose compromises Study and support




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



Emergent properties when things go right and when things go wrong.


Questions?




The Principal-Agent Loop









Structural Similarities




Cross Bracing

Co-design. Joint application.





Explain request Which is "Wider"?






Principal why

Multiple purposes

Supertype

Subtype


Agent *how* Multiple means




Package Delivery

Overnight Package Delivery


Academia vs Industry




Inspect




Monitor




Academia vs Industry



Inspect



Monitor



+Cooperation

-Vulnerability

Xanadu Hypertext

Agoric Open Systems

Object-capabilities

+Cooperation

-Vulnerability

Xanadu Hypertext

Bi-directional links

Fine-grained skepticism

Agoric Open Systems

Object-capabilities

+Cooperation

-Vulnerability

Xanadu Hypertext

Bi-directional links

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Agoric Open Systems


Prices guide tradeoffs


Encapsulation as property rights

Object-capabilities

	+Cooperation	-Vulnerability
Xanadu Hypertext	Bi-directional links	Fine-grained skepticism
Agoric Open Systems	Prices guide tradeoffs	Encapsulation as property rights
Object-capabilities	Authority-driven design	Nothing but objects

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Agoric Open Systems	Prices guide tradeoffs	Encapsulation as property rights
Object-capabilities	Authority-driven design	Nothing but objects
JavaScript standards Frozen realms	Solid abstraction mechanisms	Defend invariants






"... tested thoroughly ... written specifically to evade testing.


But such evasion is likely to require some suspicious-looking code, ..."

Building Reliable Voting Machine Software Ka-Ping Yee 2007 dissertation

for (i = 0; i < limit; i++)
if (j ===
$$72374928$$
)

Passes all tests.






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
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



for (i = 0; i < limit; i++) for (i = 0; i <= limit; i++) if (j ===
$$72374928$$
)

Passes all tests.

Looks weird.

Looks fine.





for (i = 0; i < limit; i++)
if (j ===
$$72374928$$
)

for (i = 0; i <= limit; i++)

Passes all tests. Looks weird. Fails on zero and one. Looks fine.



Need Overall Conclusions

Get past the mutual disdain Study the composition of compromises Identify cross-bracing opportunities Design for... Design languages to support... De-emphasize human vs object focus on cross cutting distinctions build mixed world Incentives for people Constraints for software

Tradeoff Alignments

	Concrete. Hierarchy	Abstract. Decentralized
Trust and Reputation	Admission controls. Aligned intentions	Open entry. Scalable
Static Inspection	Lint, code reviews. Find some bugs	Verify properties. Constrained behavior
Powers	Commons, administered. Low coordination costs	Narrow, transferable. Limit risk
Explanation	Informal understanding. Adaptive judgement	Explicit specification. Reuse, Competition
"Incentives"	Objective function. Market prices Inarticulate goals Aggregate tradeo	
Dynamic Monitoring and Feedback	Defensive testing. Fail fast, report bugs	Intrusion detection. Repair damage

The Elements of Decision Alignment

	Human to Human	Human to Object	Object to Object
Select	Trademark Chain of custody	App stores White and black lists	Trusted developer Same origin
Inspect	Accounting controls	Trusted path URL bar	Types, Verification Open source eyeballs
Allow	Law, Contracts	App permissions Powerbox	Security Protection patterns
Explain	Language	User interface	Abstraction
Reward	Economics Incentive Alignment	Objective functions	Machine learning Agorics
Monitor	Reviews, Complaints Word of mouth	Bug reports	Contracts, Testing Backprop

Yee Voting Machine

